In an early-2009 literary flourish we condemned spammers to hell, discussed the Tedroo spambot’s increased momentum due to the shutdown of other botnets, posted screenshots of the Tedroo spewed pharmaceutical spam and related scam sites, and noted its distribution via malicious pdf files. Tedroo’s increased presence and its distribution is continuing into 2010. As a matter of fact, while the distributors are relying on users’ delays in updating their vulnerable pdf readers like Acrobat, the distributors are actively maintaining/modifying the bot itself — AV scanner results on the repacked binaries are very low as the modified variants are newly re-released.

Vulnerable systems with out-of-date Adobe Acrobat installs are the main focus of the attacks involving the Tedroo spambot. The spambot commonly is being distributed via a set of canned attacks using what appears to be a version of the Liberty Exploit kit. The Liberty pack maintains an effective set of Acrobat attacks, and considering the thousands of Acrobat attacks prevented on ThreatFire systems since the beginning of Jan, the attacks themselves are well chosen — vulnerable versions of Acrobat Reader continue to be readily available, even in this new decade. 

Once the malformed pdf’s shellcode is passed control on a victim system, it attempts to download multiple components from another server. In our samples, a system hosted in China. There are several downloads to choose from on the server. The first of the files is a loader, carrying a packing stub somewhat similar to the recent Bredolab packed malware with an outer layer of encryption on top of a UPX packed inner layer. It drops a dll to an alternate data stream of a random file in the windows or system32 directory. It then registers that ADS in the AppInit_DLLs so that the dll is loaded at startup. The dll is loaded, and maintains a long list of paths and executables. Most are related to security solutions (examples are listed below) and system components. It terminates a group of them immediately. It then adds entries for security software to the Restricted Software Policy list in the registry, an AVKill method that we haven’t seen fully described as one elsewhere:  HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers\0\Paths\<SID>

C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\PC Tools
C:\Program Files\Common Files\PC Tools
C:\Program Files\Kaspersky Lab
C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Kaspersky Lab
C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Kaspersky Lab Setup Files
C:\Program Files\ESET
C:\Program Files\Panda Security
C:\Program Files\Avira
C:\Program Files\Norton AntiVirus
C:\Program Files\Alwil Software
C:\Program Files\Agnitum
C:\Program Files\Symantec

With that undetected (on the day of discovery) component loaded and AV processes killed, the Tedroo spambot is loaded. In the latest loader variants associated with the bot, we observe an interesting entry point with anti-debug and anti-emulator tricks that can be vaguely described as an abuse of “Modern” CPU Instructions. In this case, the packer implements an unexpected x86 VMX instruction — VMLAUNCH. Versions of reverser-friendly Ollydbg decode it to “sgdt edx” and cannot handle the instruction at runtime, reporting to the user that it does not know how to step into it, while some vendor emulators also have a difficult time decoding it. 

Windbg, on the other hand, decodes the vmlaunch command properly as specified by the Intel Reference material, seen below…

Following the malware entrypoint, a windbg deadlisting shows “mov ecx, 0×4fffh”, followed by the vmlaunch. On processors we observed, this setup thows an exception for an Illegal Instruction with ecx = 0×4fffh. The writers of this trick, however, took it upon themselves to force the code to trigger this exception 20,479 times (the decimal representation of 0×4fffh). It’s implemented by registering an SEH pointer to code that simply stores the counter, decrements it, and returns back into the ExcecuteHandler2 function within ntdll that’s within the standard flow of Windows exception handling. Each time, the exception “handler” code returns back into RtlDispatchException and eventually NtContinue, where CONTEXT.eip takes control directly back to the Illegal Instruction location, triggering yet another exception. When the counter finally is decremented to zero, the unpacking stub then modifies CONTEXT.eip on the stack so that flow passes out of this exception loop at ntdll.NtContinue and further into its unpacking stub. Tricky stuff indeed.

Decrement ecx value within the process CONTEXT struct

Continuing on its code path, the code first checks if it’s been run before on the victim system, looking for registry values it creates:

HKCU  “Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”
 HKCU  “Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\policies\Explorer\Run”
 HKLM  “Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”
 HKLM  “Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\policies\Explorer\Run”
    value: userini path: c:\windows\explorer.exe:userini.exe

It copies itself as an alternate data stream of explorer.exe
     c:\windows\explorer.exe:userini.exe

It sets this ADS to load at startup in the various autorun registry entries listed above, and then runs thru a series of sleeps/gettickcout to delay activity and cloak itself.

 After a long wait, the spambot calls InternetConnectA and HttpOpenRequestA to contact its hardcoded server and retrieves more spam templates. The resulting spam recently has all led to www . pharm directbook .com, another ”Canadian Pharmacy #1 Internet Online Drugstore”. This behavior is similar to that noted in our past post. The sites have been run for years by a group otherwise known as “Glavmed“, selling knockoff, illegal pills with shifty names like “Viagra Professional”…

In spite of the significant shutdowns over the past year, spam like Tedroo’s continues to mess it all up on the net. Don John couldn’t have tried to mess up a good thing any better himself.